Ashish Sharma
Why there were no good guys in 2003
In the week marking the 10th anniversary of the illegal United States and British-led invasion of Iraq, a BBC TV Panorama programme carried material to the effect that six months and three months before the March 2003 invasion, two high Iraqi officials separately told the CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service MI6 that Iraq had no active weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) — but the information was never passed on to the politicians. The invasion and its aftermath were riddled with procedural and institutional failures and gross illegalities, but the greatest political failures were the inability and unwillingness of the relevant representative assemblies, the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament, to perform their constitutional duty of scrutinising their respective executives.
The procedural failures themselves arouse suspicion. The Panorama programme, made by Peter Taylor and aired on March 18, says the first Iraqi source was Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, who, the then CIA station head in Paris learnt, hated Saddam Hussein for murdering his brother. The second was the head of Iraqi intelligence, Tahir Habbush Al Tikriti, who initiated contact and met a British agent. Yet the notes the CIA officer, Bill Murray, made in New York and posted to be typed up in Washington had their introduction modified, and then seem to have disappeared; a Senate inquiry said it could find no trace of them. As for the Habbush material, MI6 never passed it on; it apparently thought Saddam Hussein had designed it to mislead.
Fantasies
Taylor recognises that Habbush’s approach may have been an attempt by Saddam Hussein to forestall an invasion — but Habbush was telling the truth, and was in fact saying what the United Nations weapons inspectors had been saying publicly for several years already. Neither the CIA nor MI6 seems to have tried to investigate the truth of either set of statements. On the other hand, bad intelligence, as Murray himself told Taylor, reached the top very quickly; that included the fantasies peddled by Ahmed Chalabi and by a contact called Curveball, an Iraqi-born and German-settled chemical engineer named Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi.
The latter, according to Martin Chulov and Helen Pidd of the Guardian , pulled off one of the “greatest confidence tricks” in the history of modern intelligence by keeping up the deceit for six months; the German government passed his fictions on to Washington before deciding he was lying. Al-Janabi was shocked to hear many of his own lies repeated by Secretary of State Colin Powell in the now infamous speech to the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003.
The failures by the security bodies were compounded by the way sections of the U.S. and British press created a climate favourable to the war. A 2003 Cardiff University study on British broadcast news for the first three weeks after the invasion found that the BBC displayed the greatest “pro-war” bias among the four main British broadcasters. In that period, 11 per cent of its sources were from the Iraqi coalition government or of military origin, and the corporation used government sources twice as much as the commercial broadcasters ITN and Channel 4 News. Secondly, Channel 4 used independent sources like the Red Cross three times as often as the BBC, and even Sky used such sources twice as often. The BBC also placed “least emphasis” on Iraqi casualties, mentioning them in 22 per cent of stories on the Iraqi people, and it was the least likely of the four stations to report on Iraqis who opposed the invasion.
In addition, some of the BBC’s own staff seem to have accepted government statements without question. David Cromwell notes in Why Are We the Good Guys? (Zero Books, 2012) that the corporation’s current affairs superstar Jeremy Paxman has said he himself was convinced by Mr. Powell’s U.N. speech; he thought Mr. Powell had had access to all the relevant information, and he assumed that such an eminent person would not lie over this matter. As Carl Bernstein has written elsewhere, that is precisely what the mainstream U.S. press had thought 30 years earlier about the officials who tried to cover up the Watergate scandal. Paxman also later admitted to having been “hoodwinked” by the then British Prime Minister, Tony Blair.
Fabricated stories
Furthermore, as the investigative journalist Nick Davies shows in his book Flat Earth News (Vintage Books, 2009), the U.S. and British security services repeatedly planted fabricated stories in the mainstream media, which the latter, under commercial pressure to achieve sales and audience ratings, did not cross-check. Media gullibility and collusion with the political establishment over Iraq are well known; the New York Times later published an apology for not scrutinising the Bush administration’s claims better.
Yet several institutions of state are also implicated in what amounted to failures of democratic processes and institutions. For example, the then British attorney-general, Lord Goldsmith, revised his earlier analysis and said the invasion would not breach international law, but he did so because the chief of military staff Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, now Lord Boyce, doubted the legality of the invasion enough to ask for a fresh legal opinion.
Lord Boyce even said that if he was going to end up in the dock of the International Criminal Court, he wanted to see ‘other people’, which he later admitted meant Tony Blair and Lord Goldsmith, indicted alongside him.
There were, of course, staff in the CIA and in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office who resigned over the fixing of intelligence to serve the politicians’ purposes and over the neglect of analyses questioning the legality of the invasion. Those resignations, however, do not obviate the implication that some of the seniormost staff in the CIA and MI6 had themselves decided, like Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair, that Iraq had to be invaded irrespective of the evidence.
For the United Kingdom, an even greater problem is that neither the main executive body, the Cabinet, nor the representative and sovereign assembly, Parliament, so much as saw the complete text of Lord Goldsmith’s 13-page document, dated March 7, 2003, which contained inter alia the attorney-general’s doubts that the invasion would be legal without a further U.N. resolution. Secondly, the former Cabinet Secretary, Lord Butler, has said he was not aware that MI6 had the information Naji Sabri had given the CIA, but that if the CIA had provided that intelligence then “perhaps” MI6 was not permitted to share it with other British bodies. Lord Butler, in effect, has accepted that the CIA can pool information with MI6, a British body, but that the United Kingdom as a body politic has no right to that information. Despite Mr. Blair’s documented subservience to the U.S. — something which may also have been driven by a fear that the opposition Conservatives would call him soft on terrorism — this constitutes a serious abdication of British sovereignty.
Worse still, Lord Butler told the Panorama programme that the British public has “every reason” to think it is the body which was the most seriously misled. This is crucial. Neither the media failures nor those of the professional public-service bodies would have mattered if the United States Congress and the British Parliament had scrutinised their respective governments properly. Steven Zunes notes inTruthout that Congress — members of which have large bodies of staff and are far better funded than many other legislators around the world — had many months to investigate the Bush administration’s claims about Iraq. Mr. Zunes adds that “large numbers” of scholars, Middle Eastern political leaders, and former U.S. officials advised members of Congress that an invasion would probably cause a bloody insurgency, and a rise in Islamist extremism and sectarian violence.
As for the ruling British Labour Party, it had 368 MPs and a majority of 167 in the House of Commons at the time; in the end 139 Labour MPs, 15 of the opposition Conservatives, and all 63 Liberal Democrats, voted for an amendment stating that the case for war had not yet been established. The amendment got 217 votes and was defeated by a majority of 179; yet the Commons had never been given the full legal arguments.
Much is already known about the lies, deceptions, and institutional failures which made the invasion of Iraq possible, and detail has emerged about the effect on the Iraqi population of the invaders’ chemical weapons and depleted-uranium ammunition. Yet the central assemblies of the two countries which led the invasion bear the heaviest responsibility. They failed to question their political executives, failed to use the powers they rightly hold, and failed to remember what they owe to the voters who legitimate their very presence in an elected assembly. They betrayed representative democracy itself.
The unwillingness of the U.S. Congress,
British Parliament and media to question their political executives was the greatest
democratic failure that led to the Iraq war
The Hindu(April 19, 2013)
The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960, took 10 years to negotiate, primarily because of the thorny issue of balancing, on the one hand, the reasonable expectation by India that it could use the hydroelectric potential of “Pakistan's rivers” (the Ch...
As has often been recounted, the IWT worked well for decades, even through periods when India and Pakistan were at war. But the truth of the matter is that the Treaty was not really under stress until India started (quite appropriately, in my view) building hydro power plants across the Himalayas, and, in particular, on its side of the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir. The first case, where the Indian and Pakistani Indus Water Commissioners were unable to resolve their differences, was the one of the Baglihar hydro power project on the Chenab. At Pakistan’s request, the World Bank appointed a Neutral Expert to evaluate the claims. After two years of work the Neutral Expert returned his verdict. The essence of the verdict was that the Treaty allowed for new knowledge to be taken into account, that new knowledge on sediment management meant that modern dams should be able to flush sediments through low-level gates and that this element of the design of the Baglihar dam was therefore acceptable. What the Neutral Expert completely ignored was that this change essentially meant eliminating the “limit live storage” provision of the IWT, a provision that was at the very heart of Pakistan’s acceptance of the Treaty in the first place. Since there are a large number of hydro projects on the drawing board in Indian-held Kashmir, and since the cumulative storage on the Chenab alone has been estimated to be about 40 days, this essentially left Pakistan with no protection against unintentional or intentional harm from Indian manipulation of the dead storage they were now allowed to build.
Which brings us to the Kishenganga case. The far-sighted Indian and Pakistani engineers who drew up the IWT had foreseen the Kishenganga case quite specifically and had dedicated a whole section to this specific case. Annexure D para 15 states “where a Plant is located on a tributary of the Jhelum on which Pakistan has any agricultural use or hydroelectric use, the water released below the plant may be delivered, if necessary, into another tributary but only to the extent that the then existing agricultural use or hydroelectric use by Pakistan on the former tributary would not be adversely affected.” While lawyers might, à la Bill Clinton, ponder the meaning of “has,” it is clear to most that since there was no “then existing use” by Pakistan, India was well within its rights to build Kishenganga.
In my opinion Pakistan should never have taken this case to the International Court of Arbitration (ICA), because there was, in my view, no chance that they would win the case. Another Pakistani loss after Baglihar would have several consequences, all negative for Pakistan. First, they would have wasted a lot of resources paying for high-priced lawyers. Second, they could be spending their scarce human resources on more productive areas, like improving the management of water in Pakistan. And third, as the press headlines in both India and Pakistan trumpet “India wins, again,” this would reinforce the Indian claim that “victories” over both Baglihar and Kishenganga showed that India was playing by the rules while Pakistan just wanted to harass India on these projects.
But, as the Christian Brothers told me when I was a boy growing up in South Africa, the Lord works in mysterious ways. In this case there is no doubt that India has won the battle, but I think that it has, in fact, lost a far more important war.
Live storage
What is my reasoning? The battle is about Kishenganga. The decision of the International Court of Arbitration will, indeed, mean a loss of somewhere between 10 per cent and 20 per cent of the generation capacity at Pakistan’s Neelum Jhelum project, an economic and electricity cost which Pakistan can hardly afford. But this is a one-off case — the war is about the large number of projects which India plans to build on the Chenab and Jhelum. And here it is the finding of the ICA on allowable manipulable storage which is the key issue. The Baglihar decision would appear to have provided India with a green light to build these projects with as much live storage as they chose (as long as they classified it as “for sediment flushing”). What is enormously important is that the ICA has, according to early press accounts, addressed this issue head-on and, de facto , concluded that the Baglihar finding in this regard undercut the central compromise of the Indus Waters Treaty, was wrong and should not be applied to future projects. The ICA has, apparently, specifically ruled that the design and operation of Indian hydro power projects on the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum cannot include more live storage than allowed under the IWT, even if the justification for such storage is silt management.
Joint benefits
A final word. While it is good — in the view of this observer — that the ICA has put humpty-dumpty back together again, this is not enough. It restores the status quo ante Baglihar, but that is an uneasy and unproductive status quo. Without a change, of course, Pakistan will continue to object to every project on the Indus, Jhelum or Chenab in Indian-held Kashmir (and now, armed with the ICA conclusion on dead storage, Pakistan is likely to win). This will discourage investors from investing in these vital plants on the Indian side, and will escalate the tit-for-tat response (already patent) of India trying to impede needed international support for the construction of hydropower plants in Gilgit Baltistan, which lies on the Pakistani side of the LoC. What is needed is to use the resetting of the terms by the ICA for India and Pakistan to start out in a new direction. This should be one in which there is a search for joint benefits (such as hydropower plants built in the best possible sites, with power sold both ways, and with operating rules which benefit both parties built into the project). As a long-time student of this dynamic in the subcontinent it remains my conviction that the first step in breaking the long-standing vicious cycle must come from sustained, high-level, political leadership from India. I am confident that Pakistan would respond positively to such an overture. And I am equally sure that if this great strategic issue is left in the hands of mid-level bureaucrats, the future is likely to be more of the bad-for-both-sides past.
(John Briscoe served as Senior Water Adviser for the World Bank in New Delhi. Now at Harvard University, he was recently the lead consultant for the Water Sector Task Force of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan. The opinions in this piece are his own. The photograph is of theKishenganga hydroelectric project in north Kashmir.)
While allowing India to build the Kishenganga project, the International Court of Arbitration has de facto ruled that the Baglihar decision was wrong and should not be applied to future projects
The only thing you have to do is to remember squares till 25 and remember them so well that if someone calls you in the night at 2 and asks you that what is square of 24 then you should say its 576 and not ki 'Sone Do'. So believing that we all...
For example: if you have to calculate 112^2, all you have to do is to calculate the difference from 100 and 112-100=12 and 12^2=144, so adding double of the 12 and 1(hundredth place of 144) to 100, we get 100+2(12)+1=125 and putting it with 44, we get 112^2=12544.
And if we have to calculate 87^2, the difference from 100 is (-13), and (-13)^ 2=169, so adding double of (-13) and 1(hundredth place of 169), we get 100+2(-13)+1=75, and combining 75 and 69, we get 87^2=7569
Practise the above a few times & there you go !!
The liar
Poor Zjamel. Her boyfriend seems to spend more time with Ethel than with her these
days. 'Are you two having an affair?' she asks him, more by way of a reminder that she
exists, than out of any real concern.
But Bernard is having an affair with Ethel. On the othe...
The liar
Poor Zjamel. Her boyfriend seems to spend more time with Ethel than with her these
days. ‘Are you two having an affair?’ she asks him, more by way of a reminder that she
exists, than out of any real concern.
But Bernard is having an affair with Ethel. On the other hand, he doesn’t look on it as a
‘serious’ affair. Ethel is married, and he is basically quite committed to Zjamel, who has
been through a rough patch recently. He doesn’t want to upset her, even though he
doesn’t like lying either. Gritting his teeth then, and remembering Nietzsche’s dictum
that ‘lying is a necessity of life’, just part of the ‘terrifying and problematic character of
existence’, he says: ‘ Of course not, darling,’ and gives her a big kiss.
Zjamel’s heart picks up, and she feels much better. And anyway, in a few months
Bernard and Ethel have got bored of the affair and no one ever thinks about the
matter again.
Did Bernard do the right thing?
The psychologists' tale
One of the great challenges of philosophy is the riddle posed by the ancient oracle at
Delphi, the simple injunction: 'know thyself'. Aren't most people basically good with just
a few secret sadists and repressed killers lurking amongst us?
The psychologists’ tale
One of the great challenges of philosophy is the riddle posed by the ancient oracle at
Delphi, the simple injunction: ‘know thyself’. Aren’t most people basically good with just
a few secret sadists and repressed killers lurking amongst us?
Unfortunately, it seems the difference is often only skin deep, not at all as many
philosophers imagined. Just in the last few generations we have seen the good people
carrying out the slaughter of the First World War, the concentration and extermination
camps for the enemies of the Third Reich, the prison camps and mass starvations of
the Stalinists, not to mention the ‘saturation bombings’ of civilians all over Asia, the
carefully planned genocidal killings in Rwanda, Cambodia and the Balkans – the list
goes on and on. Perhaps more chilling than the bald facts are the details caught forever
in the photographs – of the passers-by pausing to spit or throw stones at Jews on their
way to the concentration camps, or the proud small-town American folk posing in their
Sunday best by poplar trees, from which hang, in the words of the song, that ‘strange
fruit/swinging in the Southern breeze’. The fruit here being the mutilated corpses of
blacks, some of the estimated 5,000 lynched in the seventy or so years leading up to
the Civil Rights victories in the 1960s.
Stanley Milgram of Yale University devised a simple test to see whether people need to
be ‘bad’ before they can be persuaded to do bad things. Alas, it seems not. They can
be persuaded to ‘adjust’ their moral beliefs very easily. In one experiment, Milgram
asked students to give another student an electric shock every time they got answers
wrong in a sort of memory test. The ‘experimenter’ encouraged them to keep
‘punishing’ the students in the interests of science – even when they started to scream and writhe in pain. (It is of only small consolation that the student being electrocuted
was in fact an actor and part of the experiment. The indifference of the ‘ordinary person’
inflicting the pain was real enough.)
Philosophers have traditionally been suspicious of unguided human nature, with the
noteworthy exception of Jean Jacques Rousseau – who was a rogue himself. Most of
the ancients thought that only a few people could be trusted to be ethical: and that
societies needed a ‘virtuous man’ to rule over them. Confucius, like Aristotle, meant
by this, a ‘noble’ man, others reinterpreted it to be a ‘superior man’ with certain
qualities instead: wise, courageous, humane. Plato is almost alone in including women
in his definition of suitable ‘guardians’. The superior man both thinks and acts well –
virtuously – modelling his behaviour on the great men of the past. He understands that
life is a quest for perfection and learning, a quest that is unending and necessarily
never completed. Confucius identified the pitfalls on the way, the Tao , as greed and
aggression, resentment and pride, and self-interest. The best protection is education –
knowledge. A key component of which is offered in the Analects ( c. 550 BC). In reply to
an entreaty to sum up the moral life in a single word, Confucius offers: ‘Reciprocity’.
By which he meant, do not inflict on others what you yourself would not wish done
to you.
Some centuries later, Mohammed recommended the velayat-e faqih – the clerical rule
of Guardians in Islamic lands. In the twelfth century, Moses Maimonides, the Spanish
North African rabbi-philosopher (1155–1204) advised in his Guide to the Perplexed ( c.
1190) that virtue is simply a means of becoming good at following the religious code.
That other great Chinese philosopher, Mencius (371–289 BC) however, differed from
Confucius significantly, as he thought people were born good, but were corrupted by
their miserable lives (and circumstances). From his perspective the crucial thing is to
look inward for virtue, to find our original nature.
" Benevolence is the heart of man, and straightens his road. Sad it is indeed when a
man gives up the right road instead of following it and allows his heart to stray
without enough sense to go after it. When his chickens and dogs stray, he has
sense enough to go after them, but not when his heart strays."
Sam should give the catalogue to his partner for many reasons. First of all it is addressed to his partner and its his moral responsibility to make sure that she received it. Because hiding one catalogue will not solve the problem. She can see expensive equipment in many p...
Sam should give the catalogue to his partner for many reasons. First of all it is addressed to his partner and its his moral responsibility to make sure that she received it. Because hiding one catalogue will not solve the problem. She can see expensive equipment in many place whether it is on tv , newspaper etc. etc...
As the expensive equipment is not working properly hence wasting money , he should kindly but firmly tell his partner that as she should not purchase expensive equipment as they fails to do their work and the same work can be done using economical equipment.
The toaster
Sam's live-in partner has a taste in expensive nik-naks – things like toasters which burn
an icon of the day's weather on the toast, or solar-powered fountains for the garden
pond. The toaster is in the cupboard as it always burnt the middle of the toast and
u...
Sam’s live-in partner has a taste in expensive nik-naks – things like toasters which burn
an icon of the day’s weather on the toast, or solar-powered fountains for the garden
pond. The toaster is in the cupboard as it always burnt the middle of the toast and
under-did the rest, whilst the garden fountain clogged up after a day and sank to the
bottom of the pond.
– postal store, computer-addressed to the partner.
when they get home and wait for the next disastrous mistake?
The lifeboat and Sinking further
To what extent should an individual risk their own well-being for the well-being of others
(and in this case a responsible Captain risks the lives of others under his command)?
This is a slightly gorified version of the biolog...
The lifeboat and Sinking further
To what extent should an individual risk their own well-being for the well-being of others
(and in this case a responsible Captain risks the lives of others under his command)?
This is a slightly gorified version of the biologist, Garrett Hardin’s so-called ‘lifeboat’
scenario. In a bit of applied utilitarianism, it is designed to show that rich countries do
not have any obligations to poor countries, as they would endanger the well-being of
their own populations were they to attempt to admit the world’s poor in the the rich
world’s ‘lifeboat’. If the world’s wealth was shared out equally, it might only mean that
everyone had too little. Hardin argues that ‘altruism’ can only apply on a small scale.
Professor Hardin is not interested too much in rescuing individuals as he sees the
problem as one of too many people anyway. The ‘population problem’ is the ‘root
cause of both hunger and poverty’, he insists. Or rather, he says, it is the ‘180 separate
national population problems’. (That’s enough for another book, albeit not a very
interesting one.) The only important ethical principle here is that no one must try to solve
their population problem by exporting their excess people to other countries.
Expanding his famous metaphor, Hardin continues, saying that each rich nation is a
lifeboat full of comparatively rich people, some of whom feel sorry for the people in
‘more crowded’ lifeboats. These ‘heart-on-sleeve’ people, he says, should ‘Get out
and yield their place to others’. Yes, Bert can help Tom – by jumping overboard! The net
result of conscience stricken people relinquishing their unjustly held positions, Hardin
concludes with Nietzschean zeal, is the elimination of their kind of conscience from the
lifeboat. ‘The lifeboat, as it were, purifies itself of guilt.’
But there is one other possibility open to Bert. He can rescue Tom, and save the lifeboat
too – by pushing the Captain overboard. And wouldn’t that be ethical? No wonder
Professor Hardhearted’s position is that social systems are rendered unstable by such
altruistic tendencies...
On the larger scale, survival of some necessitates and requires the non-survival of the
rest. (Biologically speaking – think ‘fruit flies’.) The ‘starvation hunger process’ is
essential to the balancing of the human population. However, like the lifeboat, the global
example risks foundering on the practical question of whether the boat/rich world will
really sink – or is it just a question of squashing up a bit, maybe taking a risk on behalf of
others, which is a slightly different question.
And the bit of Captain’s schoolboy Latin? Doubtless Flintheart is saying impossibilium
nulla est obligatio – nobody is obliged to do what is impossible, one of the fundamental
principles of the old Roman civil law. Naturally, not all philosophers agree on that .