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Analyze "The Hindu" Editorial

Hi frens... *"The Hindu" editorial *is a part and parcel of CAT preperation. but to my surprise i didnt find any thread which discusses the difficult words in the editorial and discuss abt their contextual meanings.. So as a starting ef...
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check out archives in hindu beta..THE HINDU : Archives

Puys....
I want all the THE HINDU editorials of the year 2010. from january till date. is there any source where i can download it? Plz help....

its being long time for the editorials...
here it is...

How real is the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq?
4th Sep, 2010.
Under cover of darkness, hundreds of armoured vehicles rumbled across the Iraqi border into Kuwait, marking the much-touted withdrawal of American combat forces. Dominant sections of the international media interpreted the August 19 pullout as a political statement the fulfilment of a commitment by President Barack Obama to bring home troops entrapped by the Bush administration in the Iraqi military quagmire. In short, the American public was made to believe that the pullout by the fourth Stryker Brigade was leading to the end of the U.S. occupation. On August 31, Mr. Obama formally declared in a televised address that all American combat operations in Iraq had ceased. The spin-doctors in the American establishment and their willing accomplices in the media have indeed done a marvellous job. An extraordinary task of dressing up a new phase of Iraqi occupation as the beginning of its end has been accomplished.
However, many questions arise in the wake of the withdrawal. How should the pullout be interpreted, if not as the occupation entering its terminal phase? What are the facts on the ground, and what prospects do they hold for the future of Iraqis?
There are three significant markers that the Iraqi occupation is not ending and is being merely repackaged. First, the suggestion that the U.S. combat operations are ending is just not true. The nomenclature, however, has changed significantly. Instead of being called combat operations, the act of chasing militants, joint raids by U.S. Special Forces and their Iraqi counterparts on militant strongholds, and other offensive military tasks will henceforth be called stability operations.
In fact, the U.S. military officials in Iraq have surprisingly acknowledged that nothing on the ground, in terms of tactics, will change. Speaking recently to T he New York Times, Maj. Gen. Stephen Lanza, chief U.S. military spokesman in Iraq, said: In practical terms, nothing will change. We are already doing stability operations.
Secondly, decision-makers in Washington have decided to keep 50,000 military personnel in Iraq till the end of next year. However, their withdrawal is not a certainty. This was acknowledged by Gen. Ray Odierno, top U.S. commander in Iraq, during an interview with CBS television: If they ask us that they might want us to stay longer, we certainly would consider that.
Significantly, the Iraqi army chief, Lt. Gen. Babakar Zabari, has already called for an extension of the American military presence in the country. At a Baghdad conference, the Kurdish-origin General said, The U.S. army must stay until the Iraqi army is fully ready in 2020. The incumbent Prime Minister, Nouri Al- Maliki, however, later, firmly rejected the view.
Privatising occupation
Even if the Americans pull out the remaining 50,000 troops at the end of 2011, it will not mean that the Iraqis would be in charge of their security. On the contrary, the presence of security contractors, comprising a core element of mercenaries, is being beefed up and superimposed to safeguard U.S. interests. In other words, the process of privatising the U.S. occupation in Iraq through a mercenary surge is set to acquire momentum in the coming days and months.
Significantly, it is the U.S. State Department which is taking the lead in this exercise under cover of diplomatic security. It has argued that it needs personnel, equipment and related wherewithal to protect its diplomatic assets in Iraq. These include the gigantic embassy in Baghdad. Spread over 104 acres on the banks of the Tigris, it has 21 buildings, and is already the size of the Vatican. Then there are the enduring presence posts in the existing American military bases of Basra, Arbil, Kirkuk, Nineveh and Diyala. The State Department has already indicated that its assets may expand in the future, which becomes a further reason for augmenting mercenary presence in Iraq. It has already asked Pentagon for 24 Black Hawk helicopters and 50 special vehicles which can resist landmine blasts, apart from other military hardware. At present, 1,00,000 security contractors, including 11,000 mercenaries, have been deployed in Iraq.
There is also sufficient indication that private security firms will draw their manpower from third world countries to minimise shedding of American blood in Iraq. In a recent rocket attack in the protected Green Zone, two Ugandans and a Peruvian security contractor were killed. It may, therefore, not be surprising if more western private security firms open their offices in third world countries, especially Africa and Latin America, to fill their mercenary ranks bound for trouble-spots such as Iraq. India too may offer an attractive ground for recruitment.
Despite coming under sustained fire in Iraq over the last seven years, it is unlikely that the Americans have given up on their strategic objective of exercising control over Iraqi oil. This is an enduring motive of continuing the occupation, though the tactics for achieving success may change over time, in the light of the quality of resistance and competing military demands in other combat theatres such as Afghanistan.
Those who argue that oil was not a motive for Iraq's U.S.-led invasion fail to see the big picture. Of course, the invasion of Iraq was not about guaranteeing energy security to the U.S., which had multiple sources for accessing oil. By possessing unrivalled military assets, it was also well prepared to safeguard the passage of tankers from oil wells across the globe to American shores.
Control over oil
The objective of U.S. controlling Iraqi oil was both political and long-term. By establishing control over Iraq, the U.S. could do two things. One, it could potentially undermine the OPEC clout by opening the flow of Iraqi oil into the international market, thereby debilitating the cartel's ability to influence prices. This goal is yet to be accomplished and the U.S. should now be looking at augmenting Iraqi production capacity at the earliest.
Two, by occupying Iraq, the U.S positioned itself well to deny future energy flows to its emerging geopolitical rivals. The Chinese, especially, read well the political implications of the American dominance over Iraq. Anticipating the possible negative role that the Americans could play to impede their energy supplies during a crisis, the Chinese post-2003 accelerated their drive to procure oil from areas beyond the Persian Gulf. They also began a concerted effort to draw supplies through less vulnerable pipelines running into China from the neighbouring energy reservoirs of Central Asia. Given the priceless political advantages that control over Iraqi oil offers, it is unlikely that the U.S. policymakers will, as yet, be prepared to throw in the towel in Iraq.
With the Americans firmly on their their back for the foreseeable future, what options do the Iraqi leaders have to acquire greater room for manoeuvre? For starters, the Iraqis can maximise their scope for political assertion and strive for unity to the extent possible under the difficult circumstances. The first test that the Iraqis face is the formation of a new government, following the March 7 parliamentary elections. The Iraqiyya party led by Ayad Allawi, a former interim Prime Minister, has got 91 seats, followed closely by Mr. Maliki's State of Law formation. Notwithstanding their differences in background and politics, the two leaders have some basic similarities. Both are nationalists, who believe in a strong executive at the Centre as the starting point for steering Iraq out of its woes. In a country ideologically mutilated by sectarian and ethnic agendas, respect for Iraqi nationalism and a strong Centre should be enough for the two to override their differences, however substantive, in order to form a stable coalition. Along with Moqtada-al-Sadr, a Shia cleric but strong believer in national unity, the three can form the core that has enough ammunition and popular backing to resist American proclivity for perpetuating a puppet regime in Baghdad.
However, the new government cannot hope for a long-term and independent survival unless it amends, if not entirely dispenses with, Iraq's dysfunctional Constitution. In the name of federalism, the Constitution has made provincial governments so powerful that the Central executive is rendered toothless in enforcing a national agenda. Besides, Parliament has been so lopsidedly empowered that a simple majority is enough to remove an elected Prime Minister. The Constitution thus legalises the establishment of a perpetually weak Iraqi state, open to repetitive manipulation by forces both internal and external.
Finally, Iraqi leaders have the onerous task of establishing a capable national army, not a sectarian amalgamation of militias which is prone to manipulation by the Americans or their Iranian rivals.
Unless a strong state, premised on the rule of law, human rights and a credible military force emerges, Iraq is doomed to endure the ravages of a semi-colonial existence, which can be combated only by a second and more vicious wave of resistance.

  • 2 Likes  
Sorry for the absence puys.

Here is the latest article

Understanding the Pakistani floods
August 23,2010

One day in mid-April, Dr. Bernard Rieux spotted a dead rat in the building he lived in the Mediterranean city of Oran, Algeria. Thousands of rats staggered out of their hideouts in the following days and died on the streets gripped by violent convulsions, spitting blood. A fortnight later Michel, concierge of Rieux's building, was down with a strange illness. While the rats suddenly disappeared, Michel died within two days.

That is how the terrible arrival of the bubonic plague in Albert Camus' masterpiece is chronicled. Major catastrophes tiptoe unnoticed. Pakistan's flood too appeared from nowhere. When the plague first arrived, the Oranites seemed to take life for granted and couldn't grasp its full import but soon they understood they must face up to an extraordinary situation and decide on their attitudes to it. They were forced to think, reflect and discard their unauthentic existence.

The flood is described in cold figures 20 per cent of Pakistan devastated; one out of five Pakistanis' lives ruined; hundreds of thousands of electric pylons, cattle, culverts and bridges perished; farmlands inundated and crops rendered unworthy. The flood is destined to become a mathematical constant sooner or later and the residue that will endure is that the millions of human beings helplessly tossed around by it have become variables.

Pakistan, especially its elite civilian but, more importantly, the military faces an existential choice. They need to realise, as Greek philosopher Socrates once said, that the unexamined life is not worth living and they need to react in a unique way. A major catastrophe is also an opportunity to undergo transformations. However, regrettably, the discourse of the Pakistani officials and analysts has continued to turn in its old gyre. The well-known Pakistani journalist, Ahmed Rashid, typically summed it up last week as an unparalleled national security challenge for the country, the region and the international community. It has become clear this week that, unless major aid is forthcoming immediately and international diplomatic effort is applied to improving Pakistan's relations with India, social and ethnic tensions will rise and there will be food riots.

Mr. Rashid added: Large parts of the country that are now cut off will be taken over by the Pakistani Taliban and affiliated extremist groups, and governance will collapse. The risk is that Pakistan will become what many have long predicted a failed state with nuclear weapons All of this will dramatically loosen the state's control over outlying areas, in particular those bordering Afghanistan, which could be captured quickly by local Taliban. Mr. Rashid, of course, concludes predictably, taking a swipe at India and seeking the West's mediatory help in India-Pakistan relations: India has failed to respond to the crisis and there remains bitter animosity between the two countries, particularly because India blames the current uprising in Indian Kashmir on Pakistan even though Indian commentators admit that it is more indigenous than Pakistan-instigated.

From the above we get a fair idea of the thought processes in Rawalpindi within the military establishment: Pakistan's coffers are empty and the international community should loosen its purse-strings; the military is overstretched with relief work and as Mr. Rashid put it, the army is unlikely to be in a position even to hold the areas along the Afghan border; Pakistan's stability which is linked to tensions with India ought to be the concern of the West whose mediation on Kashmir, therefore, is an imperative need so as to sort out acute differences over their river systems. Fortunately, Mr. Rashid stops just short of accusing India of engineering the floods.

The shocking reality is that there has been no trace of any new thinking. The Pakistani military continues to be in a game of one-upmanship with the civilian leadership. Unsurprisingly, the military's work of rescuing flood victims is a visible act and politicians cannot match that. As a perceptive young Pakistani scholar Ahsan Butt put it: This needs to be understood because to the extent that this is purely a logistical crisis, the military almost has an unfair' advantage in that it has the better toolbox for the immediate aftermath To use a cricketing analogy, batting is a lot easier at the non-striker's end. The fact remains that the military establishment has excellent spokesmen in the mainstream media, especially the top news channels, and the media invariably apply exacting standards to the civilian leaders while, for example, the military's institutionalised corruption is simply ignored or downplayed.

Given the gigantic scale of reconstruction that lies ahead and the tardy performance standards of the civilian governments of the South Asian region, the Pakistani political elite will inevitably appear chaotic and inept in its response to the floods, while any further drain of support for the already-weak civilian government can only tighten the powerful military's grip on the power structure. This means that for the foreseeable future, the military will continue to operate with full autonomy on foreign and security policies of core concern, although the scope for conflictual relationship with the civilian leadership or the launch of a coup will not necessarily increase and may diminish in the given situation of a fundamental imbalance in the calculus of power.

To be sure, the floods have further exposed the regional, political and ethnic divisions. Most certainly, there will be nasty disputes in the coming period over the allocation of aid, especially on the part of the smaller provinces, as regards the Punjabi-dominated establishment's perceived self-aggrandisement. On the other hand, in Punjab, the main Opposition, Pakistan Muslim League (N), is in charge and it would get into a blame game with the federal government over the inevitable acts of commission and omission in relief and reconstruction. In fact, the signs are already there.

A core issue concerns the strategic impact of the floods on regional security issues devolving upon the United-States led war in Afghanistan. A mixed picture emerges. To quote an expert in the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, The U.S. has an opportunity in this disaster to do even more to demonstrate to the people and leaders of Pakistan just how helpful the U.S. and the American people can be to move Pakistan forward. But, at the same time, the problems that Pakistan faces, in the immediate near-term as well as the longer term, have simply been compounded. Everything that the U.S. already thought was going to be very difficult.

In financial terms, it means a need arises to reassess the disbursal of the $7.5-billion aid package under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation shifting attention from long-term projects to the immediate priorities. In political terms, the impact will be felt on several templates. One, there are no means of divining whether with all the King's men and all the King's horses deployed in Pakistan, Uncle Sam's image would still get burnished in the Pakistani eye. Probably, it is a long haul for the U.S.' public diplomacy even with George Sores brought into the act. A July 29 Pew Global Attitudes Project estimated that 59 per cent of Pakistanis regarded America as an enemy country. In short, the fragility of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship remains a fact of life.

On the contrary, USS Peleliu arrived off the coast near Karachi on August 12 along with helicopters and a thousand Marines who have since been deployed and Pakistan hasn't erupted in flames or protest marches. Not only will this collaboration, to borrow the words of noted author Shuja Nawaz, go a long way toward building up relationships among rank-and-file service members. It is also an extraordinary sight to see the Marines involved in relief work alongside some controversial Islamic charity organisations such as the Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation linked to the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba and the social welfare wings of the rabidly anti-American Jamaat-e-Islami.

The million-dollar question indeed is what will happen to the Pakistani military's operations in the Afghan-Pakistan border region, especially the North Waziristan area. Even the U.S. special representative for AfPak, Richard Holbrooke, wryly said, It is an equal-opportunity disaster, and military operations have effectively faded away. The bitter truth is that the U.S. is fated to learn even if Mr. Holbrooke is loath to admit it that aid will not address the real security threats in Pakistan. The high probability is that the U.S.-led coalition will soon find itself out on a limb in Afghanistan with the Pakistani military nowhere seen cracking down on the Haqqani insurgents and their allies ensconced in FATA. The implications are, simply put, too stunning to want to think about although the flood waters may help wash away the WikiLeaks documents detailing not only how the ISI sympathises with the Taliban but they also meet to plan joint actions.

Analysis: Author in this passage is analyzing life after flood in Pakistan, it's impact on social, political and internation effects on Pakistan. Author speculates that with the current situation being seen to be present for a long time, Pakistan may end up with Military rule. Author has also pointed out some of the advantages that neighbouring countries or West may try to reap out of this situation. Author also mentions West's stand on this issue. He States that pak army currenltly in Afgan should be sent back home, to assist in recovery tasks, but still remains sceptical about the outcome.

Tone:Commiserating

i would like to add something to this as well...the author sort of mocks the attitude of the pakistani journalists.. he means to say that they never learn.. they always respond in the same predictable manner.. and he also has a dig at them when he says thank god they stopped at accusing india of engineering the floods...

Sorry for the absence puys.

Here is the latest article

Understanding the Pakistani floods
August 23,2010


One day in mid-April, Dr. Bernard Rieux spotted a dead rat in the building he lived in the Mediterranean city of Oran, Algeria. Thousands of rats staggered out of their hideouts in the following days and died on the streets gripped by violent convulsions, spitting blood. A fortnight later Michel, concierge of Rieux's building, was down with a strange illness. While the rats suddenly disappeared, Michel died within two days.

That is how the terrible arrival of the bubonic plague in Albert Camus' masterpiece is chronicled. Major catastrophes tiptoe unnoticed. Pakistan's flood too appeared from nowhere. When the plague first arrived, the Oranites seemed to take life for granted and couldn't grasp its full import but soon they understood they must face up to an extraordinary situation and decide on their attitudes to it. They were forced to think, reflect and discard their unauthentic existence.

The flood is described in cold figures 20 per cent of Pakistan devastated; one out of five Pakistanis' lives ruined; hundreds of thousands of electric pylons, cattle, culverts and bridges perished; farmlands inundated and crops rendered unworthy. The flood is destined to become a mathematical constant sooner or later and the residue that will endure is that the millions of human beings helplessly tossed around by it have become variables.

Pakistan, especially its elite civilian but, more importantly, the military faces an existential choice. They need to realise, as Greek philosopher Socrates once said, that the unexamined life is not worth living and they need to react in a unique way. A major catastrophe is also an opportunity to undergo transformations. However, regrettably, the discourse of the Pakistani officials and analysts has continued to turn in its old gyre. The well-known Pakistani journalist, Ahmed Rashid, typically summed it up last week as an unparalleled national security challenge for the country, the region and the international community. It has become clear this week that, unless major aid is forthcoming immediately and international diplomatic effort is applied to improving Pakistan's relations with India, social and ethnic tensions will rise and there will be food riots.

Mr. Rashid added: Large parts of the country that are now cut off will be taken over by the Pakistani Taliban and affiliated extremist groups, and governance will collapse. The risk is that Pakistan will become what many have long predicted a failed state with nuclear weapons All of this will dramatically loosen the state's control over outlying areas, in particular those bordering Afghanistan, which could be captured quickly by local Taliban. Mr. Rashid, of course, concludes predictably, taking a swipe at India and seeking the West's mediatory help in India-Pakistan relations: India has failed to respond to the crisis and there remains bitter animosity between the two countries, particularly because India blames the current uprising in Indian Kashmir on Pakistan even though Indian commentators admit that it is more indigenous than Pakistan-instigated.

From the above we get a fair idea of the thought processes in Rawalpindi within the military establishment: Pakistan's coffers are empty and the international community should loosen its purse-strings; the military is overstretched with relief work and as Mr. Rashid put it, the army is unlikely to be in a position even to hold the areas along the Afghan border; Pakistan's stability which is linked to tensions with India ought to be the concern of the West whose mediation on Kashmir, therefore, is an imperative need so as to sort out acute differences over their river systems. Fortunately, Mr. Rashid stops just short of accusing India of engineering the floods.

The shocking reality is that there has been no trace of any new thinking. The Pakistani military continues to be in a game of one-upmanship with the civilian leadership. Unsurprisingly, the military's work of rescuing flood victims is a visible act and politicians cannot match that. As a perceptive young Pakistani scholar Ahsan Butt put it: This needs to be understood because to the extent that this is purely a logistical crisis, the military almost has an unfair' advantage in that it has the better toolbox for the immediate aftermath To use a cricketing analogy, batting is a lot easier at the non-striker's end. The fact remains that the military establishment has excellent spokesmen in the mainstream media, especially the top news channels, and the media invariably apply exacting standards to the civilian leaders while, for example, the military's institutionalised corruption is simply ignored or downplayed.

Given the gigantic scale of reconstruction that lies ahead and the tardy performance standards of the civilian governments of the South Asian region, the Pakistani political elite will inevitably appear chaotic and inept in its response to the floods, while any further drain of support for the already-weak civilian government can only tighten the powerful military's grip on the power structure. This means that for the foreseeable future, the military will continue to operate with full autonomy on foreign and security policies of core concern, although the scope for conflictual relationship with the civilian leadership or the launch of a coup will not necessarily increase and may diminish in the given situation of a fundamental imbalance in the calculus of power.

To be sure, the floods have further exposed the regional, political and ethnic divisions. Most certainly, there will be nasty disputes in the coming period over the allocation of aid, especially on the part of the smaller provinces, as regards the Punjabi-dominated establishment's perceived self-aggrandisement. On the other hand, in Punjab, the main Opposition, Pakistan Muslim League (N), is in charge and it would get into a blame game with the federal government over the inevitable acts of commission and omission in relief and reconstruction. In fact, the signs are already there.

A core issue concerns the strategic impact of the floods on regional security issues devolving upon the United-States led war in Afghanistan. A mixed picture emerges. To quote an expert in the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, The U.S. has an opportunity in this disaster to do even more to demonstrate to the people and leaders of Pakistan just how helpful the U.S. and the American people can be to move Pakistan forward. But, at the same time, the problems that Pakistan faces, in the immediate near-term as well as the longer term, have simply been compounded. Everything that the U.S. already thought was going to be very difficult.

In financial terms, it means a need arises to reassess the disbursal of the $7.5-billion aid package under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation shifting attention from long-term projects to the immediate priorities. In political terms, the impact will be felt on several templates. One, there are no means of divining whether with all the King's men and all the King's horses deployed in Pakistan, Uncle Sam's image would still get burnished in the Pakistani eye. Probably, it is a long haul for the U.S.' public diplomacy even with George Sores brought into the act. A July 29 Pew Global Attitudes Project estimated that 59 per cent of Pakistanis regarded America as an enemy country. In short, the fragility of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship remains a fact of life.

On the contrary, USS Peleliu arrived off the coast near Karachi on August 12 along with helicopters and a thousand Marines who have since been deployed and Pakistan hasn't erupted in flames or protest marches. Not only will this collaboration, to borrow the words of noted author Shuja Nawaz, go a long way toward building up relationships among rank-and-file service members. It is also an extraordinary sight to see the Marines involved in relief work alongside some controversial Islamic charity organisations such as the Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation linked to the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba and the social welfare wings of the rabidly anti-American Jamaat-e-Islami.

The million-dollar question indeed is what will happen to the Pakistani military's operations in the Afghan-Pakistan border region, especially the North Waziristan area. Even the U.S. special representative for AfPak, Richard Holbrooke, wryly said, It is an equal-opportunity disaster, and military operations have effectively faded away. The bitter truth is that the U.S. is fated to learn even if Mr. Holbrooke is loath to admit it that aid will not address the real security threats in Pakistan. The high probability is that the U.S.-led coalition will soon find itself out on a limb in Afghanistan with the Pakistani military nowhere seen cracking down on the Haqqani insurgents and their allies ensconced in FATA. The implications are, simply put, too stunning to want to think about although the flood waters may help wash away the WikiLeaks documents detailing not only how the ISI sympathises with the Taliban but they also meet to plan joint actions.

Analysis: Author in this passage is analyzing life after flood in Pakistan, it's impact on social, political and internation effects on Pakistan. Author speculates that with the current situation being seen to be present for a long time, Pakistan may end up with Military rule. Author has also pointed out some of the advantages that neighbouring countries or West may try to reap out of this situation. Author also mentions West's stand on this issue. He States that pak army currenltly in Afgan should be sent back home, to assist in recovery tasks, but still remains sceptical about the outcome.

Tone:Commiserating

  • 2 Likes  
inspiredtocrack Says
i don think the author welcomes the decision of the court..he just says so and so and elaborates their decision... his tone is is optimistic?? he jus gives some suggestions... this is pragmatic.. i would like some feedback on this..


Yes,the tone is more of pragmatic and cautionary rather than optimistic. In stead of conflict, matters of race, minorities and demography in general should be solved by talks, not courts. That's what the author wants to say.

(It is my personal view.)
Baawra mann dekhne chala ek sapna .....  
Tactful decision; Aug 9,2010

The International Court of Justice's recent ruling, upholding Kosovo's 2008 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Serbia, has evoked a predictable response, reflecting geo-political divisions. Whereas Pristina's mostly western allies have welcomed the non-binding verdict in support of the ethnic Albanian majority decision, countries contending with their own secessionist demands Spain, Russia and China have cautioned against the assertiveness of the breakaway groups elsewhere. The repression of ethnic Albanians by former Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic triggered Kosovan separatist demands in the 1990s. But the administration of the region, which is under U.N. peace-keeping for almost a decade since the 78-day long bombardment by the NATO forces, failed to produce a negotiated settlement. The Hague court has held that, as there is no bar under international law on the right to self-determination, Kosovo's declaration of independence does not constitute a violation. Nor is the principle of territorial integrity maintainable, since its scope is limited to the sphere of relations between sovereign countries. The court also ruled that the legitimacy of Kosovo's independence is a political fact that is determined by the recognition accorded by different countries, not a legal question. Such a general understanding perhaps explains why disputes over declarations of independence are rarely adjudicated at The Hague, and the case of Kosovo was the lone instance after the emergence of new countries from the collapse of Yugoslavia.

With the independence of Kosovo now a fait accompli and its membership of the U.N. a matter of time, the protection of its multi-ethnic character and the rights of Serbs and other minorities would be critical for peace and stability in the Balkans. The exuberant stance of the United States and its European allies on the secession of Kosovo was starkly at odds with their objection to Russia's recognition of the independence of the provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia in 2008. The widespread questioning of their double standards on nationhood did little to stop them. The rules on the making and unmaking of states are not drawn in chambers of law. They are lessons inferred from the unfolding pages of history and the situation on the ground including effective control. To that extent, conflicts over sovereignty and self-determination are better resolved through multilateralism and mutual respect.

Analysis:Author in this passage has welcome the decsion of International Court of Justice to uphold Kosvo's UDi despite mixed reactions from all speheres of world. He explains courts detailed decision and why it cannot be objected by anyone. Now post indepence challenges in Kosvo is highlighted by author which must be dealt smartly for maintaing peace and stability. Author has also mentioned stance of some powerfull world giants on this decision and has mentioned taht establishment of independent state is not done in a room but are done afetr due consideration

Tone: Positive and optimistic


i don think the author welcomes the decision of the court..he just says so and so and elaborates their decision... his tone is is optimistic?? he jus gives some suggestions... this is pragmatic.. i would like some feedback on this..
A strategy gone awfully wrong
Aug 12.2010

"They are justified in their pursuit," Muhammad Illyas Kashmiri told a journalist in October last, just weeks after a United States airstrike almost claimed his life, "they know their enemy well."

Recently, acting in concert with the United Nations, the U.S. Treasury Department announced a slew of sanctions against Kashmiri and the organisation he commands, the Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami. The sanctions, which freeze assets Kashmiri may have in the U.S. and forbid financial transactions with him, are largely symbolic. Key figures from the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad have long been subject to similar sanctions - but to little effect.

Nestled in North Waziristan, a mountainous region along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan that is under the effective control of Islamist guerrillas, Kashmiri's forces will be little impacted by the sanctions. The Pakistan army has been reluctant to move against them, saying it is too stretched by counter-insurgency campaigns elsewhere to open a new front.

If there is one thing the complex story of the HuJI illustrates, it is this: unless the U.S. finds a way of compelling Pakistan to act against the jihadist groups it has nurtured for so long, its cities and citizens will continue to be at risk.

Like so many jihadist groups of global reach and ambition, the HuJI was a product of the U.S.-authored, Saudi Arabia-funded and Pakistan-backed Islamist insurgency against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

In February 1980, three religious scholars at the Jamia Uloom al-Islamia seminary in Karachi's Binori Town set up the first Pakistani jihadist group to fight in that war. Maulana Irshad Ahmad, Maulana Muhammad Akhtar and Maulana Abdul Samad Sial called their organisation the Jamiat Ansar-ul-Afghaneen, or the organisation of the companions of the Afghan people.

The Harkat-e-Inqiab-e-Islami, led by Peshawar-based cleric Nasrullah Mansoor, paid for the young clerics' first weapons. Akhtar was elected to head the Jamiat Ansar-ul-Afghaneen in 1985, after Irshad was killed in combat. He took on the pseudonym "Saifullah" or the sword of God.

For the first eight years of its existence, the organisation - which came to call itself HuJI towards the end of its campaign there - focussed on Afghanistan. From the outset, though, it had global ambitions. Its objectives, Pakistani newspaper The News reported in 2001, were "to fight against the oppression of the Muslims by the infidels all over the world through the revival of the traditions of jihad. It wants to recapture for the Muslims their glorious past."

In 1991, the HuJI initiated operations against India. It also, analyst Muhammad Amir Rana has recorded in his book A-Z of Jihadi Organisations in Pakistan, set up sister networks in Bangladesh, Chechnya and Uzbekistan. Figures published in the Pakistani media make clear that the HuJI's Jammu and Kashmir operations were, by far, its most ambitious: its leaders claimed to have lost 650 men in combat there till 2004, against just 43 in Afghanistan between 1980 and 1989.

Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence directorate pumped in cash to pay for this expansion: at its peak, the HuJI was reported to be running eight training facilities in Afghanistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, which processed over 4,000 jihadists. But the battle over resources precipitated a split. In 1991, a faction led by Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman Khalil set up the rival Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.

For the next two years, clerics at the Jamia Uloom al-Islamia worked hard to heal the rift. Finally, in 1993, the two organisations merged into the Harkat-ul-Ansar. In 1994, the Harkat ul-Ansar dramatically announced its presence by taking control of the Chrar-e-Sharif mosque in central Kashmir. From later that year, though, problems began to develop. Key leaders, notably Maulana Masood Azhar and Nasrullah Langriyal, were held by Indian forces. Then, as evidence emerged of the organisation's role in the kidnapping and murder of western tourists in Jammu and Kashmir, the Harkat-ul-Ansar came under intense U.S. pressure that eventually led to its proscription by that country in 1997.

Not long after, the Harkat-ul-Ansar split again into its constituent formations. The Harkat ul-Jihad-e-Islami went into decline after the autumn of 1995, when Akhtar was held on charges of attempting a coup against Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The Harkat ul-Mujahideen did better - for a time. But in January 2000, Azhar was released from jail in return for the passengers of an Indian Airlines flight hijacked to Kandahar. He returned to Pakistan, and with the ISI's patronage, founded the Jaish-e-Mohammad. Following a bitter power struggle, he took over much of the Harkat ul-Mujahideen.

Kashmiri had been a bit-actor as much of this story unfolded: he claimed in interviews that he was jailed in India, and that he participated in a major terrorist strike in New Delhi but there is no evidence to back either claim. Born in Pakistan-administered Kashmir in 1964, Kashmiri joined the HuJI soon after dropping out of a mass communications degree course in Islamabad. He was among a small group of ideological radicals who resisted the ISI's pressure to join Azhar's JeM and, following the India-Pakistan crisis of 2001-2002, scale back operations in Jammu and Kashmir. Pushed out of Jammu and Kashmir in 2005, Kashmiri was increasingly drawn to the jihadists fighting in Afghanistan. He was even briefly detained on suspicion of having participated in an attempt to assassinate President Pervez Musharraf.

In theory, Azhar supported the global jihadist project. "The fundamental argument of each one of Azhar's books and many published speeches," Pakistani scholar and diplomat Husain Haqqani wrote in a 2005 paper, "appears to be that puritanical Islam faces extinction at the hands of an ascendant secular culture, just as the fledgling religion was challenged by unbelievers in its earliest days." Indeed, "Azhar's argument for fighting India in Kashmir is rooted in the same theological arguments that Osama bin-Laden has cited in his declarations of war against the United States." But where bin-Laden was willing to fight against the U.S. in Afghanistan, the ISI-linked Azhar wasn't.

Kashmiri began working closely with the jihadists opposed to the Pakistani state - and, by 2009, drifted into the ranks of the al-Qaeda. "The defeat of the American global hegemony," he explained in a 2009 interview to Pakistani journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad, "is a must if I want the liberation of my homeland Kashmir."

The HuJI cadre have been responsible for training hundreds of insurgents operating against the western forces in Afghanistan, as well as a string of bombings in both that country and Pakistan. That, however, is not the extent of their ambitions - and reach.

Less than a month after the failed bomb strike on Kashmiri, the Federal Bureau of Investigations held Pakistani-American jihadist David Headley - and found evidence that the new-form of HuJI he commands holds out a credible transnational threat. Long a key Lashkar operative, Headley had, among other things, helped collect a video footage that guided a 10-man assault team to its targets in Mumbai in November 2008. But he became increasingly frustrated with the organisation's reluctance to support operations against the West.

Headley railed against the Lashkar's leadership, saying it had "rotten guts." "I am just telling you," he hectored a Lashkar-linked friend in a September 17, 2009 phone conversation, "that the companies in your competition have started handling themselves in a far better way."

Kashmiri received Headley at a camp in North Waziristan last year. "The bazaar," Headley wrote in an internet post, "is bustling with Chechens, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Russians, Bosnians, some from European Union countries and, of course, our Arab brothers. According to my survey, the foreign population is a little less than a third of the total. Any Waziri or Mehsud I spoke to seemed grateful to God for the privilege of being able to host the foreign Mujahideen."

In the months before his arrest, Headley made contact with Kashmiri and began tapping his associates for assistance to bomb the offices of Jyllands Posten, a Copenhagen newspaper which incensed many Muslims by publishing cartoons they believed were blasphemous.

Earlier this year, an audiotape released to mark the death of al-Qaeda operative Said al-Masri claimed Kashmiri even had a role in attacks against India. "I bring you the good tidings," he said, "that last February's India operation was against a Jewish locale in the west of the Indian capital , in the area of the German bakeries - a fact that the enemy tried to hide - and close to 20 Jews were killed in the operation, a majority of them from their so-called statelet, Israel. The person who carried out this operation was a heroic soldier from the 'Soldiers of the Sacrifice Brigade' which is one of the brigades of Qaedat al-Jihad in Kashmir, under the command of Commander Illyas Kashmiri, may Allah preserve him."

For years, the U.S. ignored groups like the HuJI, trusting the ISI to ensure that their India-focussed energies never turned to the West. That strategy, Illyas Kashmiri's story makes clear, has comprehensively failed.

Analysis: In this article author is criticisng policy of US govt. to fund jehadi groups likes Huji in hope that they would ahve focussed all their activites against India and kepp west out of their radar, but US has fallen a foot with this startegy which is evident from headly and kashmiri's claims and messages. He has described roles of various leaders in the groups arsing in Pak and surrounding areas in recent years with evidence that their attrocities have ifected not only the immediate neighbours but far fetched allies also. Inshort author mentions US has been a complete failure in it's policy of supporting illegal groups to grow.

Tone: Criticising and Analytical

in above article "A strategy gone awfully wrong" , the author co relate sequence of events from late 90's to till now , which act as the support for his motive or conclusion which is mentioned quiet clear in end para of article.

i have found this article more "descriptive(using access of data)along with criticizing and analytical.....any comment any one......???
Article from The Guardian
Vedanta in talks to buy into Cairn Energy in India
Aug 12,2010

Vedanta Resources,the London-listed metals producer controlled by billionaire Anil Agarwal, said today it was in talks to buy a stake in the Indian spin-off of Cairn Energy as interest in Britain's resources companies continues to intensify.

Edinburgh-based Cairn, an oil and gas exploration and production company, has a 62% stake in Cairn India, a hugely successful division listed in Mumbai.

It is not clear what size stake Vedanta is seeking or how much it would have to pay, although any deal could be worth billions of pounds. Cairn India, which operates the country's largest onshore oilfield, is valued at $13.5bn (8.7bn).

"Discussions are ongoing. There can be no certainty the contemplated acquisition will occur or of the terms of any such acquisition," Vedanta said in a statement.

The prospect of a deal to excite London's army of merger and acquisition (M&A;) bankers and lawyers emerged as the chances of another in the same sector receded. Dana Petroleum, the UK explorer focusing on the North Sea and Africa, said it could no longer continue confidential talks with Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) about a possible takeover offer. The company said that KNOC would not raise its 1.67bn bid, made last month.

Energy companies have been among the drivers of M&A; activity this year as turbulent equity and credit markets have pushed investors into commodities and natural resources.

Oil and gas deals have reached $162bn globally so far this year, up from $116bn last year, ranking third in the M&A; league tables by industry, according to data from Dealogic. Only telecommunications and finance have struck bigger transactions.

A stake in Cairn India would open Vedanta to the oil and gas exploration markets, and would give Cairn cash to fund its expansion in the Arctic region, analysts said. Cairn Energy, which is exploring for oil off Greenland, said last month that Cairn India's first-quarter cash flow from operations rose to $108m, a four-fold increase over the same period last year. Cairn Energy's stake in its Indian subsidiary is the company's biggest asset.

Led by the 57-year-old Agarwal, Vedanta said in 2008 that it would spend $20bn in India on mines and power plants over four years.

Castigated

The company has recently attracted international criticism for alleged "crimes against the environment". At its annual shareholders meeting in London, protesters, including Bianca Jagger, attacked its plans to dig a bauxite mine in an area in Orissa, eastern India, which is said to be held sacred by indigenous people.
Amnesty International published a report last year claiming that a Vedanta refinery in the same area had polluted local rivers, damaged crops and disrupted the lives of the Dongria Kondh tribe in the Niyamgiri Hills.

Agarwal and Vedanta's chief executive, MS Mehta, rejected charges of having displaced local people after the construction of the refinery, claiming their operations would "spread wealth" to one of India's poorest regions.

A strict vegetarian, Agarwal ranked 10th on the annual Sunday Times Rich List of Britain's wealthiest people, with a fortune of 4.1bn. Son of a small businessman who made aluminium conductors, he built his wealth from Sterlite Industries, an industrial business he founded in 1976. He created Vedanta in 1986 by putting together a variety of family firms, and in 1999 established a continuous copper rod plant.

Vedanta's revenue has soared from $3.7bn in 2006 to $7.9bn in fiscal year 2010, according to the company's website. The business employs more than 30,000.

Unimpressed

Today's announcement left some analysts unimpressed. "A move into oil would be a very strange shift away from Vedanta's core business of developing mines and smelters, with their primary commodity exposure being base metals and iron ore," Credit Suisse wrote in a note to investors. "We therefore struggle to see any strategic fit or synergies."
Investors were also concerned about Vedanta's ability to fund any possible deal, as its debt stood at $900m at the end of March. Any significant purchase would need to be financed by a new share issue, analysts said.

The potential stock dilution sent Vedanta shares down 7.4%, or 176p, to 22.47, the biggest loss in the FTSE 100.

Cairn Energy, another member of Britain's main stock market index, gained 1.8%, or 8p, to 452.8p. The group, valued at about 6.2bn, spun off the Indian operations in 2007, in the subcontinent's largest initial public offering.

Petronas, the Kuala Lumpur-based oil company, also holds a 14.9% stake in Cairn India, according to Bloomberg.

Analysis: Here author is talking over a buyout that Vedanta is planning in Cairn's Energy India Operation. Possible pros and cons of the deals are mentioned. It is also mentioned that Vedanta already in huge debt might have to reshuffle it's share prices for adjusting this huge expense deal, which might be of some billion dollars. Author has given an indication what deal may bring with it by metioning the dip and rise in share prices of Vedanta and Cairn respectively.

Tone: Analytical and suggestive
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